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THE FAMILY OR THE FARM: A SOPHIE’S CHOICE? 
THE LATE MEDIEVAL CRISIS IN FLANDERS 
Erik Thoen and Tim Soens 
Flanders as a Test Case of the Malthusian Explanation for the Crisis of the Late Middle Ages 
♣ The county of Flanders provides an interesting test case with which to verify the neo-Malthusian 
Duby-Postan thesis about the so-called late medieval crisis. The reason is that, on the eve of this 
period, this county was one of the most densely populated areas of Europe. Malthusian theory would 
therefore lead us to expect a bottleneck between food supply and demand, creating population losses 
and other crises. Yet few historians believe that Flanders as a whole experienced a profound crisis. 
Even the Black Death could not disrupt the economy. A plausible and consistent explanation of the 
gap between theory and history has never been attempted. Did Malthusian checks fail to materialize 
because of the area’s local characteristics? Or does the Flemish experience deny the applicability of the 
Malthusian model? For a long time Flemish historians could only speculate about these questions. 
We will show that historians have underestimated the dimensions of crisis in parts of Flanders. Our 
results demonstrate the need to get past older generalizations in order to formulate better 
explanations. There was a crisis in Flanders, a crisis that must be explained within the structure of the 
larger medieval rural economy. 
Although Flanders is not large, within it different regions experienced the classical elements of crisis 
in different ways, so a regional explanation is necessary. We will explain how regions of Flanders 
differed and why distinct areas grew and declined in varied ways. This diversity requires a definition of 
local economic and social structures, a theoretical framework we call ‘social agro-systemic’ areas. 
The Regional ‘Social Agro-Systemic’ Approach 
We define a ‘social agro-system’ as a system of rural production based upon region-specific social 
relations involved in the economic reproduction of a given geographical area. Social agro-systems in 
this particular sense were not stable and underwent structural changes. Social agro-systems consisted of 
many qualifying and mutually influencing factors. They were determined by the different social 
relations and structures of local society, such as the soil and the environment, the social relations 
influenced by property rights, property relations, and power structure, labour relations and income 
policies (and possibilities) of peasants, agricultural techniques, and the relations with other agro-
systemic areas. In the later Middle Ages, possibilities for economic growth as well as vulnerabilities to 
economic decline resulted from an interplay among all these elements; differences in their features 
reflect regional differences in social agro-systems.1 
Further on, we will show that the effects of the crisis were different in two regions: sandy inland 
Flanders and the coastal area, two areas which were evolving towards different social agro-systems 
during the Middle Ages (see Map 7.1). However, before trying to link the economic crisis of the later 
Middle Ages in Flanders with the differentiating features of these regional agro-systems, we need to 
describe the regional impact of the crisis phenomena in these areas. 
[Insert Map 7.1 here] 
 
1 The theoretical framework of agro-systems is developed in Thoen, ‘Social Agro-systems as an Economic Concept’. 
This text was last revised in 2010. 
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Map 7.1. The Former County of Flanders on a Current Map. 
The Late Medieval Crisis in Flanders: Data and Regional Difference 
Direct demographic information is very poor for medieval Flanders. Series of demographic parameters 
such as hearth censuses are missing.2 Most data are indirect, based on mortality censuses, sources about 
family composition, archaeological data, and so on. Within the limited context of this paper, we 
cannot elaborate on demography, but it is nevertheless clear that the number of inhabitants declined in 
the late Middle Ages in both coastal and inland Flanders. 
It is likely that a demographic peak in inland Flanders came at the end of the thirteenth century. 
Nevertheless, most signs of demographic decline manifest themselves later, between about 1370 and 
1410, as the result of high mortality rates.3 The influence of the mid-fourteenth-century shocks of the 
Black Death was thus not immediately apparent; on the other hand, real demographic and economic 
recovery came quite late, after the civil war against Maximilian of Austria ended in 1492.4 
As far as we know from research, the demographic decline did not bring about either abandoned 
fields or the disappearance of settlements. If we look at the size of landholdings, only a limited process 
of concentration took place. As Figure 7.1 shows, the majority of very small holdings, created in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, survived the crisis. Often some of the smaller holdings even became 
smaller since part of the available land was integrated within newly created estates owned by 
townspeople who emulated the clergy and nobility. 
[Insert Figure 7.1 here] 
Figure 7.1. Diagram showing the evolution of the size of the holdings in both inland and coastal 
Flanders (@ represents the size and relative number of the holdings). 
Production did not change in any fundamental way as a result of this decline; Flanders retained a 
fundamentally mixed-farming economy, focused on the production of cereals, combined with 
significant production for the market.5 
In coastal Flanders, signs of crisis emerge at the end of the thirteenth century. Here, structural 
changes were occurring since the thirteenth century. It appears that the smaller holdings gradually 
disappeared during the later Middle Ages. In some areas this tendency accelerated during the later 
fourteenth century, near Oostburg, for example, an area which is well documented.6 Here many 
farmsteads went bankrupt and disappeared, their land absorbed into larger holdings. Many larger 
settlements and villages with churches fell victim to storm surges; some resurrected, others never 
recovered.7 The majority of farms became larger mid-sized concerns. More than before, they turned to 
 
2 Thoen, ‘Historical Demography’. 
3 Thoen, ‘Historical Demography’, pp. 577–80. 
4 Due to this late recovery and the relative light effects, Gérard Sivéry labeled the crisis in the Southern Netherlands 
‘the Burgundian crisis model’: Sivéry, Structures agraires. 
5 Data for Inland Flanders in Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen, vol?, 845–77, and Scholliers, 
De Conjunctuur van een Domein; Meyhuys and Daelemans, De oudste domeinrekeningen van Herzele 1386–1394; Van 
Maelzake, ‘De financieel-economische politiek’. For Coastal Flanders, see Verstockt, ‘Conjunctuurstudie van een 
domein in de late middeleeuwen’. The results of this study about the evolution of the size of the holdings are 
published in Soens and Thoen, ‘The Origin of Leaseholding’. Other unpublished data are used as well. 
6 St Peters Abbey of Ghent and the hospital of St John in Bruges had numerous estates in this area. Also the water 
board called Oude Yevene, north of Oostburg, left abundant cadastral archives, records analysed by Vanslembrouck, 
Lehouck, and Thoen, ‘Past Landscapes and Present-day Techniques’. 
7 The North Sea engulfed a large part of the territory of Flanders near the coast in the fourteenth to fifteenth 
centuries. Kuipers, Sluimerend in slik provides an overview of the actual state of research about lost villages in this area. 
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breeding cattle, a tendency reflected in growing consumption of dairy products and meat in this area.8 
Nevertheless, grain production also remained important. The end of the crisis is difficult to detect: it 
seems that the evolution which had begun before the late Middle Ages continued well into the 
sixteenth century.9 The process of concentration and demographic regression can be traced in the 
written sources which mention many ‘lost villages’ as well as ‘lost farms’. Archaeology and aerial 
photography have also uncovered numerous Wüstungen, and recent research provides much new 
evidence of desertion of habitat. 
[Insert Figure 7.2 here] 
Figure 7.2. Value of wages in rural Flanders (in liters of wheat). 
We have been able to trace prices and wages back much earlier in time than the series known until 
now. They allow us to measure the influence of the crisis much more clearly on a local basis.10 In our 
opinion, wages of unskilled workers give particularly useful indications about the changes in the supply 
of labour.11 In Figure 7.2 we compare the wages, expressed in values of wheat, of unskilled labourers 
and skilled carpenters working in both areas. The results are eloquent. Although data are scarcer for 
inland Flanders, they show that around 1300, wages in the coastal area were lower than in inland 
Flanders. In the course of the fourteenth century regional differences narrowed: workers in inland and 
coastal Flanders seemed to have earned about the same daily wage. This suggests that wages rose more 
in the coastal area than in inland Flanders. In comparison with the period around 1300, wages of 
unskilled labourers near the littoral more than doubled by 1400. No increase of that magnitude 
occurred in inland Flanders, where wages stagnated. The differences between both areas became even 
more pronounced in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: in the fifteenth century real 
wages in inland Flanders were between 20 and 40 per cent cheaper than along the coast. This striking 
difference is partly due to the fact that the labour supply became tighter in coastal Flanders than in 
inland Flanders. This evidence of the unequal impact of the later medieval crises begs for an 
explanation. 
Some historians categorically reject the evidence for a price scissors in the southern Netherlands on 
the whole, when discussing prices of cereals and industrial products.12 Nevertheless, it is clear that if we 
start our price series around 1300, industrial products show more upward movement than 
commodities such as cereals in the later Middle Ages.13 Moreover, new data show that a relative decline 
of grain prices had already begun in the 1270s.14 
Land leases provided another classic index of economic development. In Figure 7.3 we compared 
leases of parcels in inland and coastal Flanders. The cost of leases was heavy in both areas around the 
beginning of the fifteenth century. Although for inland Flanders, this graph does not cover the period 
before 1430, it shows that, during course of the fifteenth century, a divergent movement widened with 
 
8 Dehaeck, ‘Voedselconsumptie in het Brugse Sint-Janshospitaal’. 
9 The concentration process continued in the seventeenth century: Thoen, ‘De twee gezichten van de Vlaamse 
landbouw’. 
10 For a long time, wages and prices for Flanders were only available from the second half of the fourteenth century, 
but data for the earlier period can be now be found in Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen. Newer 
unpublished data for the coastal area in Vandenborre, ‘Prijzen, lonen en levensstandaard’. 
11 Wages are also influenced by other elements, as we will see below. 
12 Genicot, La crise agricole. Price scissors are unequal long-term evolutions of prices such as cereals, meat, industrial 
products, and wages. In this respect, the works of Wilhelm Abel are still valuable. 
13 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen, I, 234–99. 
14 This will be elaborated in a later study. 
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the upward pressure on leasing costs higher in inland Flanders than in the coastal area.15 Although we 
cannot explore in the context of this article the full dimension of this split, we can dispose of data 
which suggest that this divergent evolution started much earlier than the figures show. Indeed, around 
1270–1300, leasing prices in the coastal area were already much higher than in inland Flanders. 
Moreover, the scissors between prices and wages opened with different intensity depending upon the 
area. 
[Insert Figure 7.3 here] 
Figure 7.3. Prices of leases in Inland and Coastal Flanders (1375–1545 in liters of wheat). 
Some historians have argued that a late medieval crisis resulted from a crisis in feudal relations. In 
this model, lords, in the broad sense of the word, reacted against the structural changes of the twelfth 
to thirteenth centuries by increasing their incomes, with negative effects for society as a consequence.16 
In some areas, the aristocracy increased its income in the late thirteenth century; in western Europe 
this was mainly a reaction to financial difficulties confronting lords. In Flanders, we have shown that 
between about 1250 and 1300 the falling rate of feudal levy per head brought difficulties to many lords 
who could no longer expand their demesne incomes through land reclamation. Nor could they profit 
from the population increase, which they had often stimulated in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.17 Near the end of the thirteenth century, various seigniorial groups maximized their 
opportunities to extract surplus in order to maintain their income. But the struggle between different 
seigneurial classes had affected seigneurial revenues, albeit differently depending upon the group and 
the area, and especially depending on their ability to adapt income strategies to changing 
circumstances. 
Although we cannot elaborate this here, an increasing number of foreign studies confirms our view 
that one of the typical characteristics of the classic feudal period before the later Middle Ages was not 
arbitrary rent collecting, but rather fixed customary charges, often laid down in perpetuity, and 
originating from pressures which peasants themselves brought to bear. As the decline in value of the 
feudal levy per head gradually lowered the incomes of large landowners, they tried to adapt their 
extraction of surplus through various means at their disposal. Many wanted to change the fixed rents 
and taxes into variable levies. But this was not easily accomplished and could happen only in areas 
where seigniorial property and power structures would allow it. It was much easier for lords to change 
fixed rents in the coastal area than in inland Flanders. 
‘Long Live the Family’: The Rise of a ‘Commercial Survival Economy’ (CSE) in Inland 
Flanders 
In the rural area of inland Flanders, a specific model of economic and social behaviour emerged before 
the late Middle Ages. It underwent some changes during the late Middle Ages, but fundamentally it 
dates back to the period before the crisis, the central Middle Ages (1100–1300). 
Inland Flanders consists of lighter sandy and sandy-loamy soils whose formation was not influenced 
by the sea. Reclamation of land began in the early Middle Ages and earlier. This resulted in a less than 
rational infrastructure. Aside from the growing shortage of firewood, largely overcome through the 
creation of a hedgerow landscape, the physical environment in inland Flanders did not burden 
 
15 The data in Figure 7.3 are based on Verstockt, ‘Conjunctuurstudie van een domein in de late middeleeuwen’ and 
Van Maelzake, ‘De financieel-economische politiek’. 
16 See e.g. Kosminsky, ‘The Evolution of Feudal Rent’; Hilton, ‘A Crisis of Feudalism’; Bois, Crise du féodalisme. 
17 As clearly shown for Normandy by Bois, Crise du féodalisme. 
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peasants.18 Smallholdings were by far in the majority, and their size gradually decreased. Many things 
contributed to the fragmentation of the countryside into a mosaic of smallholdings. Already a 
common phenomenon in many areas on the Continent, fragmentation in inland Flanders reached a 
level unusual in Europe for a range of reasons. We cannot go into all the details, but these are the basic 
reasons. 
Firstly, peasants in this area slowly obtained access to most of the property rights of their cultivated 
lands in the course of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries. Existing customary rents were low and even 
decreasing in value, and rents were often symbolic for newly reclaimed lands. Earlier than elsewhere, 
lords allowed many of the rents in kind to convert into rents in money which were prone to 
depreciation. Lords in this area manifested a precocious interest in earning cash money because of the 
influence of the developing monetary economy in this intensively urbanized area. Moreover, a 
structural competition between different groups of lords in this area weakened their possibilities for 
extracting peasant income. 
So, from a very early stage, most peasants were de facto owners of farmsteads for which they still 
paid depreciated seigneurial dues. Especially in the first stage of the Middle Ages, these peasants did not 
compete with one other; on the contrary, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, communities 
cooperated in the management of infield-outfield rotations systems.19 They also frequently lived 
together in hamlets, called greens, generally situated next to the infield. Peasant solidarity dissolved 
during the thirteenth century as common fields and common practices lost importance and 
disappeared. 
Many peasants depended upon revenues from part-time work on larger holdings, especially during 
the slack periods of the agricultural season. Every village had one or a few larger holdings owned by 
large landlords. Some of them dated back to the early or classic Middle Ages and were former demesne 
centres, curtes. The institutional links between the smaller holdings and the larger manors through 
services were traditionally limited. These large estates not only delivered additional incomes to the 
smallholders through wages, they also gave peasants the means to share capital like horses or ploughing 
in exchange for work on the farm.20 The first concern of these peasants was to assure the survival of 
their families. 
Because of this attitude of family survival — typical for a pre-capitalist society — the peasants were 
not interested in large holdings.21 During the demographic boom of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, 
they divided their holdings.22 But there were additional, typically Flemish reasons which stimulated the 
extreme fragmentation of the holdings in this social agro-system. First of all, the low rents encouraged 
Flemish peasants to invest as much as possible in their own land, leading to intensive husbandry. But 
beyond this, it became increasingly easy after 1250 for peasants to borrow through the sale annuities, 
again because of the abundance of cash money in this highly commercialized region, which encouraged 
children to obtain their own holdings. After marriage, children got their own share of the family 
estates, which they could then use as collateral for the sale of an annuity. Since customary rents were 
low, they could borrow quite a lot using their land as collateral.23 Land and credit markets grew very 
dynamic because of the widespread peasant ownership of land and ready access to capital. 
 
18 Thoen and Soens, ‘Energy: Tension between Ecology and Economy’. 
19 Thoen with Lambrecht, ‘Le paysage flamand’. 
20 Lambrecht, Een grote hoeve in een klein dorp. 
21 Brenner, ‘The Low Countries’. 
22 Simple acquisition of property rights encouraged peasants: Brenner, ‘The Low Countries’. 
23 Thoen and Soens, ‘Appauvrissement et endettement’. 
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In sum, in inland Flanders there were extra stimuli for an extreme fragmentation of holdings. This 
could provide explanations for questions we have yet to formulate; for example, why so many of the 
common fields dating back to the High Middle Ages were eliminated so early in Flanders compared 
with many other regions.24 They may have played a key function in this economy. Perhaps the 
abundance of cash and persistently low rents for newly reclaimed land limited the resistance of 
peasants to their disappearance. Moreover, the precocious fragmentation of holdings and the 
consequent disappearance of a middle class may have weakened the ability of very small peasants to 
resist their disappearance. The structure of the village community became too weak. It is also not 
unlikely that during the thirteenth century, the private appropriation of these commons was not seen 
as a negative practice by other peasants, if it curbed the tendency of holdings to diminish in size. 
During the thirteenth century, the struggle for land became the basis of survival. Agrarian 
individualism became the standard. Unlike the first stage of the classic Middle Ages when infield-
outfield and communal practices were common and common fields still functional, the survival 
economy of inland Flanders was no longer an agro-system based upon community solidarity. The hunt 
for land raised prices. 
Seigniorial power influenced the social relations within an agro-system as well. The word 
‘seigniorial’ is used here in the broad sense of the word: it refers to all non-peasant individuals and 
institutions owning substantial amounts of land which exercised some form of extra-economic or 
political power over the peasant population. It is easy to imagine how any changes in the type of 
lordship affected property relations and thus the social agro-system of inland Flanders. We think that 
at least two features already mentioned — peasant property rights and the decreasing peasant solidarity 
— were both affected by seigniorial structures. 
Since the second half of the eleventh century and especially since the twelfth century, lords 
exercised extremely scattered power in inland Flanders. A tactical power struggle took place among the 
count, numerous secular and ecclesiastical local lords, and of course, given the level of urbanization, 
increasing numbers of bourgeois investors after the second half of the thirteenth century.25 This 
struggle prevented a harmonious coexistence between large landownership and the possession of 
jurisdictional rights. The counts used the towns to eliminate the judicial power of local lords while the 
larger towns, from the twelfth century onwards, became a judicial threat for the count, which led to 
many disputes and resulted in civil wars in the later Middle Ages. Judicial power lost its influence over 
property rights, and this eventually advanced peasant property rights. The result was that the peasant 
holdings, which were almost free given the restrained customary rents, could survive more easily and 
much longer here than along the coast. 
This competition between different elites gave birth to another institution which undermined 
village solidarity in inland Flanders. This institution was called the bourgeoisie foraine or buitenpoorterij 
(literally ‘external burghership’). Since about 1250 it was possible for village people to acquire the 
status of townsman, and many peasants seized the opportunity.26 In some areas up to 40 and 50 
per cent of all villagers were buitenpoorters in the later Middle Ages. This institution could only thrive 
under the protection of the count whose alliance with the Flemish towns created it in order to increase 
the influence of the towns in the hinterland. The count fostered buitenpoorterij, of course, in order to 
curb the power of local lords in the countryside in favour of the town’s and the count’s own judicial 
representatives. Only in a later period, when large towns such as Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres threatened 
 
24 Research on this topic for the Middle Ages in the Southern Netherlands is still very scarce. 
25 Thoen, ‘A “Commercial Survival Economy” in Evolution’, pp. 107–10. The idea that power competition or 
collaboration had great infuence on local economic development has been put forward by Brenner, ‘Agrarian Class 
Structure’, pp. 30–75. 
26 The influence of the buitenpoorterij on power structures has been described in Thoen, ‘Rechten en plichten’. 
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comital power, did the counts put brakes upon this privilege, but they nonetheless continued to 
encourage buitenpoorterij in smaller towns, in an attempt to use them as counterbalances to the power 
of the large urban centers. Buitenpoorterij lost some of its importance in the later Middle Ages, 
although it survived until the end of the Ancien Régime. It probably undermined the political 
coherence and internal solidarity of village communities since local inhabitants were split up into 
people who were buitenpoorters and people who were not. Thus we believe that this institution was 
responsible for, inter alii, the early disappearance of peasant solidarity reflected in the loss of the 
commons. Here as in coastal Flanders, village communities gradually based social relations upon purely 
economical ties loosely connected to a small administrative backbone. 
In both the coastal area and inland Flanders the contrast between unfree and free labour lost its 
influence upon the organization of work. Since the High Middle Ages, free labour was predominant, 
and the ties between large and small holdings determined the organization of labour. Since the 
distribution of large and small holdings was different in each region, labour relations diverged as well. 
In inland Flanders most workers were non-residents working part time. If they lived in large farms, it 
was temporarily, during a limited stage of their family life cycle. Generally speaking, wage labour in 
inland Flanders provided only a part of the peasants’ income, because it was combined with the very 
intensive cultivation of a smallholding, as well as with proto-industrial activity. The latter, mostly wool 
and later also linen processing, can be traced back to the thirteenth century.27 In later periods there is 
proof that the large holdings even provided organizational support for proto-industrial activity; this 
may already have been the case earlier.28 But the interdependence between large farms and 
smallholdings in the same area was influenced as well by the distribution of capital; it is likely that, in 
exchange for labour, larger holdings lent horses for ploughing and other goods to the smaller ones.29 
This kind of economic and social structure affected labour productivity. Small peasant holdings, 
which the majority of the holdings were or became in the course of the twelfth to thirteenth centuries, 
probably had very low productivity with a tendency to fall. The cultivation of flax and the processing 
of linen used labour inefficiently, as did the spade with which a large part of the arable land was 
turned.30 However, was not this tendency of labour productivity to fall countered by increasing 
physical productivity? 
To a certain extent it was. Recently, historians have concluded that a major intensification of 
agriculture using mixed farming methods became common in Flanders before the late Middle Ages. 
Yields per hectare were high from at least 1300: 1500 to 2000 litres for rye and 2500 to 3000 litres for 
the widely cultivated oats were not uncommon. Since the thirteenth century, smaller farms in 
particular applied large inputs of labour in order to reduce the fallow in crop rotations and cultivated 
fodder crops and industrial crops such as dyes, flax, and hemp.31 Thus an increasing physical 
productivity per unit of surface was made possible only through the expenditure of enormous amounts 
of human labour. This increased labour input was way out of proportion to the increased physical 
output which a shortage of fertilizer limited until the modern period.32 In sum, it is likely that, despite 
 
27 Linen became much more important after 1500 as a proto-industrial activity and this until the nineteenth 
century. 
28 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen, II, 1004–05; Lambrecht, Een grote hoeve in een klein 
dorp, pp. 101–07. 
29 As later in the eighteenth century, see Lambrecht, Een grote hoeve in een klein dorp, pp. 113–33. 
30 For calculations about the unproductivity of linen processing, see Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in 
Vlaanderen, II, 997–99. For the use of the spade in Flemish agriculture, see ibid., pp. 781–83. 
31 Verhulst, ‘L’intensification et la commercialisation’; Thoen, ‘The Birth of the “Flemish Husbandry”’. 
32 Despite the high labour input, Flemish agriculture could only produce about 1500–2500 litres of rye and wheat 
per hectare until the late nineteenth century. 
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the increasing physical productivity per surface unit, labour productivity had declined in the course of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.33 
The survival economy of inland Flanders was not a survival economy isolated from markets. We 
have called this a ‘commercial survival economy’ or CSE.34 Since the size of peasant holdings gradually 
declined as holdings split up in times of demographic growth, survival of family members was the 
prime concern of peasants. They developed different strategies to ensure this survival: intensive 
cultivation of the land resulting in a high physical output per acre, a constant search for additional 
sources of income such as wage labour leading to symbiotic labour relations with large farms, and 
production for the market through proto-industrial activities such as the cropping of vegetable dyes, 
flax, and so on. The first concern was not investment or profit making which might increase a holding, 
but rather the survival of family members.35 
Further Evolution of the Inland-Flemish Agro-system in the Later Middle Ages after 1250 
How did this agro-system react to the crises of the late Middle Ages? In fact, it did not change much at 
all. The majority of minor farms were preserved. The average size of these smallholdings in some cases 
increased a little, but most of them still did not exceed five hectares in area. Some peasants lost their 
land to holders of larger farms. Indeed the number of large farms increased between c. 1250 and 1450 
because of purchases of small plots of land by townspeople who wanted to create large farms. These 
larger farms in this period were all leaseholds, created in emulation of the nobility and to assure the 
personal provisioning of the richer townspeople in periods of grain shortage or high prices. So, the 
number of coqs de village increased, although their farms were not in general larger than twenty-sixty 
hectares. These large farms dominated the economies of rural communities through the work they 
provided and through the offices their holders occupied. 
Some big farms worked land with resident servants, but this was not a major trend. From about the 
fifteenth century until the sixteenth century, the number of larger farms remained more or less the 
same in the villages; every village had between one and five, with a maximum of about ten, cultivating a 
large percentage of the total area under plough (between 25 and 50 per cent).36 During this period 
many large farms decreased in size and giant farms disappeared. This trend nevertheless favoured the 
bond between large and small holdings, providing smaller holdings with a survival strategy based upon 
wage earning. The peasant economy became an economy based upon this collaboration between 
smaller peasants and larger farms. 
Since about 1250, leaseholding became common for these larger farms, while small peasants 
generally held light customary rents.37 As larger giant farms lost land, the detached plots were 
occasionally leased as well. In inland Flanders leaseholding became common during this period for 
most of the smaller plots of land as well. Because it was especially the large farms which were taken in 
lease, the inland market for land to lease was completely different from that on the coast and so too 
were the relations between large landowners and leaseholders. Indeed, contrary to the coastal area, in 
inland Flanders there was not yet a competitive market for land since there were candidates for renting 
a large farm. In general, farms were leased for many generations by the same families, so long as they 
 
33 Proof of this bipartite evolution from data in the nineteenth century can be found in Thoen, ‘A “Commercial 
Survival Economy” in Evolution’. 
34 Thoen, ‘A “Commercial Survival Economy” in Evolution’. 
35 See Brenner, ‘The Low Countries’. 
36 Between 25 and 60 per cent of the cultivated area. 
37 In our opinion, in the Ancien Régime, larger farms could only survive in the long term with large financial 
backers since the risks of destruction were so high. Only in the course of the eighteenth century did risks (e.g. from 
war) decline, allowing larger farms to come into the hands of country people. 
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paid their rents and maintained a good relationship with the owner.38 Large farmers had few occasions 
to compete for leased land, since that kind of land was not available to increase their land 
significantly.39 Therefore these large inland farmers in the CSE system, although they produced for the 
market, did share the same competitive capitalist mentality which prevailed on the coast. For many of 
them, the principal concern also was the survival of family members. They competed in the market for 
the purchasing of land, not for the leasing of it. Except for the oldest son of the farmer, all other 
members of the family had to begin their independent careers as a small peasant, like other members of 
the village community. 
As was the case before 1250, most peasants in the area kept the largest part of their land and the 
buildings on their farmsteads in a form of customary tenure akin to full property. Proto-
industrialization remained an important additional income for many peasants. The rural flax and linen 
industry had two periods of expansion: 1370–1420 and after 1470.40 As before, inland Flanders was 
influenced by towns as the power of local lords declined, with the consequence that judicial property 
rights and the rights over estates were often in different hands. 
This made a seigniorial reaction much more difficult. The shift from fixed and stable nominal rents 
of decreasing real value to adaptable rents like leases was, as we have seen before, not so easily 
accomplished in the inland area. Secondly, it curbed, for a long time, capital extraction by the count’s 
taxation. Direct taxes collected by the comital state became common in the 1360s. But only from the 
late sixteenth century onwards did this new financial levy become a pressing burden upon Flemish 
peasant society. Until then, these taxes remained relatively low. Because the count negotiated the taxes 
(beden) with representative groups of which the large towns had the most influence, these taxes rose 
only for brief periods, for example, before and after insurrections, unlike in other countries. Historians 
have overlooked this for a long time.41 In short, local power structures hindered a seigniorial reaction in 
Flanders. ‘State feudalism’, which replaced lordly feudalism in many areas of Europe, could not fully 
develop.42 Thus the CSE system, which originated in the classic Middle Ages, survived and was 
responsible for the limited symptoms of crisis in Flanders. 
Crisis and the CSE Agro-system in Inland Flanders 
The CSE agro-system was less vulnerable to crisis: although small peasants were market oriented, they 
were not dependent upon the market or market prices of cereals. They produced a ‘survival basket’ of 
products for their own consumption which also stabilized their incomes: in addition to cereals, most 
had one or a few cows, some bees, and produced some textiles. This was all part of a survival strategy. 
Many peasants purchased some grain, at least when prices were cheap, and the price evolution favoured 
their income more than it damaged it. In short periods of crisis when grain prices rose dramatically, 
peasants appealed to larger farmers for help. Some industrial and semi-industrial products such as dyes 
could be sold for better prices during a short-term crisis. Moreover, it is likely that their employment 
rate was going up as the number of larger farms who needed part-time wage labourers increased. Their 
market sales allowed peasants to profit from changes in urban industry like the new orientation 
 
38 This has been noticed by Tits-Dieuaide, ‘Peasants Dues in Brabant’, although she did not give an explanation for 
this phenomenon. 
39 For smaller plots of land competition occurred as much as in the coastal area, but the supply of land which was 
leased was much too small to influence the agro-system fundamentally (see the high leases in Figure 7.3). 
40 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen, II, 980–1020. 
41 Thoen, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen, I, 613–36, and the graph in Thoen, ‘A “Commercial 
Survival Economy” in Evolution’, p. 136. 
42 Kosminsky, ‘The Evolution of Feudal Rent’. 
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towards fashionable textiles.43 It is well known that these changes in the Flemish textile industry relied 
in part upon ‘putting out’ work to the countryside.44 Proto-industrial activities were flexible, well 
suited to the needs of a majority of the inhabitants of smallholdings, and were fully employed on their 
own land. Larger farms, in which wages were important to the incomes of smallholders, took advantage 
of this situation as well. The wages became lower in inland Flanders than in coastal Flanders.45 This 
was almost certainly caused by the fact that wage earning was, for most of the labourers, only a part-
time activity; after all, the number of resident labourers was small. The income of these part-time 
labourers was not solely dependent on employment because they were peasants, and during the months 
that most labourers were needed on the larger farms, the supply of labour was very high since most 
members of peasant families hired themselves out in the labour market. These are additional causes 
which help explain how the CSE of inland Flanders was structurally responsible for the lack of crises. 
Features and Origin of the Coastal Agro-system before about 1250: First Signs of Change 
The most important environmental feature distinguishing the agrarian system of the coast from that of 
the inland is, of course, the North Sea. The sea could be a positive force, but usually it was a threat. In 
the High Middle Ages, and especially between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries, the soils 
composed of embanked and re-embanked heavy marine clays and sands gradually replaced salt marshes 
and peat bogs. This was the result of both human intervention and natural changes to the 
environment: peat bogs settled, partly in response to human drainage systems; storm surges and 
overexploitation by humans of the natural dune barrier gave the tidal outlets of the sea more occasions 
to flood and depose sediment. Historians have made various attempts to distinguish successive waves 
in the influence of the sea from the Carolingian period onwards, but there is no agreement about the 
exact chronology. It is, however, undeniable that the cost of protecting the area against the sea steadily 
rose in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, although these costs were not yet rationally 
used in favour of the environment. Ecology aside, underinvestment in infrastructure by large 
landowners with short-term profits in mind — and their influence was increasing in the central 
Middle Ages — increased the cost of maintaining vulnerable coastal infrastructures like dikes. The 
consequences for the peasants were considerable. Yet peasants invested in significant infrastructure, 
rationally developed. They were responsible for an extensive and ever expanding network of canals, 
necessary for draining the area, as well as for transport over water to regional markets. 
We still do not know enough about the structures of the rural society in the coastal area before 
1300, but it is likely that until about 1250–1300, differences in social structures between inland and 
coastal Flanders were probably less pronounced than they became in later centuries. In 1300, peasant 
smallholders were in the majority, or they were at least very common both inland and on the coast. 
However, in the coastal area there must have been more large holdings (including some giant ones) in 
the eleventh to thirteenth centuries than in inland Flanders, since flocks of sheep (especially until the 
twelfth century, often on salt marshes) and stockbreeding (especially since the twelfth century?) were 
common. A social relation between smaller peasants and larger landowners must have been common 
too, just as was the case in inland Flanders. Although concrete data about the size of the smallholdings 
are scarce, many of the small peasants (as in inland Flanders) needed an additional income via various 
 
43 Kosminsky, ‘The Evolution of Feudal Rent’. 
44 Holbach, Frühformen von Verlag und Grossbetrieb. 
45 See Figure 7.2. Other mechanisms probably also helped the larger farms to survive in this CSE system, e.g. the 
fact that they often worked in proto-industrial crafts (with family members, with wage earners, and even as brokers), 
the fact that they had good relations with the owners of the farms (who needed these farms for their own survival 
during the crisis), and the fact that they could often pay part of the rent in kind to religious landowners who did not 
have to pay undirect taxes when they imported foodstuffs into towns. 
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proto-industrial activities such as wool processing, fishing, and especially peat digging and salt making, 
activities which were practised on a very large scale in this area.46 Peat became an essential product for 
the increasing town economies. 
In many areas in coastal Flanders in the tenth to twelfth centuries, the smallholders were 
freeholders of much of their land. According to recent research, in this period, and maybe even earlier, 
these peasant landowners played a major part in the occupation of the salt marshes and peat bogs.47 
This kind of society, like that of inland Flanders, could, despite some structural differences which 
were surely present, be labeled as a commerical manorial economy (CSE). However, in contrast to 
inland Flanders, it would not endure. Although the major changes in our description seem to have 
taken place after 1250, the cornerstones for a new kind of society were gradually laid from about 1200, 
although its beginnings are hard to measure. 
It is likely that this new society was caused by a different seigniorial structure in combination with 
ecological changes. Indeed, the increasing influence of the count in combination with a growing 
influence of large landowners (see below) was affecting this picture since about the twelfth century, 
since the classic Middle Ages seigniorial structures in this area were not based on competition, like in 
inland Flanders.48 The old seigniorial power of lay lords was restrained, and the count as an overlord 
had and kept much more judicial power here from the beginning of the emergence of the county in the 
twelfth century.49 The count was able to keep the early medieval system of officials representing 
committal power on a local level (the schout) intact. This was one of the main reasons that the power of 
the rare local lordships, which came into existence in this area during the High Middle Ages, was 
limited. So, as we have mentioned, many peasants enjoyed a completely free status. 
Due to the same sustained local power of the counts, the large strips of wasteland in this area, 
especially the vast tracts of initially common peat land, could from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
onwards smoothly become full property of the count.50 These lands were subsequently sold to private 
institutions (monasteries, hospitals, alms houses, and the like) and rich townspeople. In this way the 
buyers could reinforce their position of power in the redistribution of income between a new category 
of lords, whose power was especially based on rural estate, and peasants. Next to this, it also provided 
an easy way to increase their income, because there was no pressing power of traditional local lords 
whose power was based on rights of justice which could oppose them or nibble at their income. The 
interests of local administrative and judicial power went along with the interests of the large private 
landlords. The seigneurial pressure on the peasants became clearer. 
This contrasting evolution of property structures in coastal Flanders was certainly intensified by the 
above-mentioned growing ecological pressure on the coastal area from about the period 1100–1300 
onwards, with heavy financial consequences for its population — mischief from which inland Flanders 
was spared. Although it is difficult to measure in this early period, it is likely that many peasants in the 
coastal area could not afford the increased maintenance costs for the infrastructure, let alone the costs 
for re-diking after storm surges. For many peasants living in the belt between the sea and the River 
Scheldt the increased number or increased effects of storm surges made it impossible to contribute 
sufficiently to new embankments. This resulted in numerous evictions of impoverished peasants. The 
application of the so-called ‘right of abandon’, which was only possible due to the important committal 
 
46 Soens, ‘Les tourbières disparues de Flandre’. 
47 Tys, ‘Landschap als materiële cultuur’. 
48 Thoen, ‘Social Agro-systems as an Economic Concept’, pp. 54–57. 
49 Partly because the Count of Flanders was originally a local lord from the coastal area in the neighbourhood of 
Bruges: Tys, ‘Domeinvorming in de “wildernis”’. 
50 Tys, ‘Domeinvorming in de “wildernis”’. 
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power, automatically transferred the private property rights of insolvent peasants to those who could 
bear these costs, that is, the larger landowners like abbeys, hospitals, and the urban bourgeoisie.51 
So, near the sea, the lordly collaboration model between the count and the upper classes favoured 
new structures of large landownership. Its corollary was the beginning of the loss of property rights of 
numerous peasants who, until that time, had virtually, if not always nominally, owned their land. In 
this period many lost part of their rights by becoming peasant fief holders either of the count or of a 
religious institution. In this case their loss was only partial because fiefs were hereditary and entrance 
fees were low. Much more dramatic was the effect of the ‘right of abandon’, which was applied in the 
area since at least the twelfth century. To get their land back, the peasants had to pay high customary 
rents. As we will see below, since about 1250 many peasants not only lost their properties, they also had 
to become leaseholders if they wanted to continue their agricultural activities. This was clear proof of 
the effectiveness of the collaboration between the judicial power of the count and local lordly power 
based on the possession of land and capital. 
‘Long Live the Farm’: The New Social Agro-system or ‘Commercial Business Economy’ (CBE) 
after 1250–1300 
Although the structures of the society were already clearly under pressure before the second half of the 
thirteenth century, the CSE system was quickly decaying during the later Middle Ages. During the 
later Middle Ages the more well-to-do farmers could overcome their problems in the longer term; a 
large part of the peasant smallholders disappeared and were integrated in larger holdings. As we have 
noticed already at the beginning of this article, the economy became gradually more and more based on 
a majority of larger more commercially oriented farms. The number of small peasants was gradually 
going down.52 In some places this evolution is noticeable in the sources as early as the late thirteenth 
century; elsewhere it took place after 1400 in particular. 
The social polarization created a growing class of full-time and resident farm labourers, who, for 
most of their lives, worked on a large farm. Proto-industrial activities or non-agricultural income 
strategies such as fishing, peat digging, and perhaps also salt making, which were still very popular in 
the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, gradually lost importance in the course of the later Middle Ages. 
Peat, the basic product of most of the proto-industrial activity, became scarce. Many peat layers had 
become less accessible because they were covered with sediments from the sea. Moreover, around the 
middle of the sixteenth century most of the peat at surface level, the easiest to be cut, was gone. But as 
farms grew larger and became more commercially oriented, they were also less interested in non-
agrarian subsidiary business. 
Contrary to what occurred in inland Flanders, the accelerated decrease of peasant property rights to 
land almost completely changed the property structures of this society.53 In the coastal area since about 
1250 there was an unmistakable evolution towards a rural society in which leaseholding dominated. At 
the eve of the early modern period most peasants had been forced into leasing. As if this was not 
enough, many of the families, if they were very unlucky, were evicted from their farmsteads, which 
were gradually absorbed by larger farms in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and 
even later on in the sixteenth century. 
Indeed, the ecological pressure on the coastal area increased in the later Middle Ages. The costs for 
maintaining the infrastructure were high and further impoverished the peasants. Large environmental 
 
51 Soens and Thoen, ‘The Origin of Leaseholding’. 
52 Soens and Thoen, ‘The Origin of Leaseholding’, p. 38. 
53 Soens and Thoen, ‘The Origin of Leaseholding’. 
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disasters are known to have permanent consequences, such as the cascade of storms in the late 
fourteenth century, especially in 1375, 1389, 1404, and 1424.54 
We have already mentioned that, as far as we can see, even in the coastal area and despite the 
institutional arrangements via water boards, durable investments by large landowners provoking 
ecological stability were limited; their profits exceeded their reinvestments by a lot. In the coastal area 
the failing of large landowners to think on a long-term basis was to a large extent responsible for the 
disastrous impact of storm surges between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries.55 Durable 
investments in the environment via a well-maintained infrastructure were indeed absent, although the 
necessity to invest in a sustainable environmental policy became pressing as a consequence of changes 
in the physical environment. Let us not forget that this was a medieval feudal system in which money 
was only put into the short-term maintenance of dikes and locks. Undoubtedly this was partly due to 
the fact that the water boards were more and more dominated by the large landowners, most of whom 
did not live in threatened areas themselves. What’s even more, in the long run they could actually even 
profit from the floodings, since they were the only ones able to finance new embankments, and this 
situation offered them opportunities for the enlargement of their estates and consequently for their 
power in the area. It is only from the second half of the seventeenth century that regular taxes for a 
durable sustainable environmental policy became common, under the influence of a more centralized 
government and a new class of more capitalist-oriented towns, people, and investors. It is likely that the 
influence of central government also increased, but further investigation is needed. At any rate, after 
1600 damage from storm surges decreased. 
The aforementioned ecological changes and ecological disasters freighted many peasants with 
difficulties. This impoverishment of peasants was causing losses of peasant property. Many peasants 
obtained credit by the selling of annuities. This practice became very common, but many peasants 
could not pay the annuities and lost their land to large landowners from whom they took it back in 
lease.56 
The more common application of the so-called ‘right of abandon’ accelerated this process of 
impoverishment and expropriation. The implementation of this legal device transferred the private 
property rights of insolvent peasants to those who could carry the freight, that is, the larger 
landowners. Indeed, this practice furthered the development of short-lease arrangements benefiting 
the latter group since peasants who lost their land in property had no other choice than to take this 
land back in lease. As we mentioned before, the application of this legal system was only possible 
thanks to the described seigniorial relations based on collaboration between the large landowners, 
mostly religious institutions, and the centralized judicial power in the hands of the count. 
Thus increased ecological pressure, combined with the specific seigniorial power relations and the 
increased needs of lords for variable rents, caused and accelerated changing property structures in the 
coastal area on a much larger scale than in inland Flanders. Leaseholding became the typical form of 
landholding during the late Middle Ages. 
The process of impoverishment wiped out the smallest peasants. The prevailing leasing system 
hindered the division of holdings. Those who survived through leaseholding were forced to compete 
for land. This stimulated further engrossment and innovation.57 It opened the way towards a 
‘commercial business economy’ (CBE). This agro-system consisted of a majority of larger, but not 
giant, farms. They produced for the markets, and their goal was not survival of the family, but survival 
of the commercial farm. In coastal Flanders many larger farms emerged out of peasant smallholdings, 
 
54 Gottschalk, Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen. 
55 Thoen and Soens, ‘Van landschapsgeschiedenis’. 
56 This does not exclude other reasons (see above, note 5). 
57 See the very clear study of Brenner, ‘The Low Countries’. 
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worked with resident servants who were much cheaper. The number of smallholders who needed an 
additional income was low, which made wage earners expensive. As some scarce data from later periods 
such as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seem to reveal, there was a constant migration from 
the coastal area towards inland Flanders, where many sons of farmers tried to buy land to start their 
own holding. Vice versa, it is likely that the coastal area was attracting multitudes of seasonal workers 
from inland Flanders, who were needed during harvest time. In this way, both agro-systems supported 
each other’s existence and evolution. 
In sum, while in inland Flanders, the CSE survived despite shocks in the later Middle Ages, in the 
coastal area, the peasant economy which was already under pressure was replaced by a new kind of 
social relation based on a majority of larger and middle-sized, to a large extend commercially oriented, 
farms (CBE). 
This CBE system affected labour productivity in a different way than in inland Flanders. While 
difficult to measure, it is likely that labour productivity was higher on commercially oriented farms of 
middle and large size. This implies that, from the later medieval period onwards, labour productivity 
must have been increasing in the coastal area, while simultaneously going down in inland Flanders. 
Compared to inland Flanders, cash crops in the coastal area, such as wheat, and fodder crops, such as 
vetches, which were often consumed on the spot, clearly demanded less labour, as did cattle breeding, 
which was gaining importance.58 That was probably also the main reason that, with the increasing size 
of farms, the production of madder (a dye product requiring a lot of labour input) declined in coastal 
Flanders.59 
Typically for this area, increasing labour productivity was supported by high physical productivity. 
A combination of intensive techniques of arable farming, which mostly date back to the period during 
which the area still had features of a peasant society (CSE), and the switch to more valuable and 
labour-reducing cash crops such as wheat suggests that labour productivity was growing. In inland 
Flanders, productivity was probably already declining on the eve of the late Middle Ages and remained 
low, as the survival economy stood firm. 
Until the later Middle Ages, village solidarity within these coastal communities was important. 
Nevertheless, contrary to what has often been written, the change from a CSE towards a CBE brought 
about a decline in solidarity.60 Here, a parallel can be seen with inland Flanders, where village solidarity 
eroded within the CSE itself. This evolution manifested itself in the fact that the rural inhabitants of 
coastal Flanders gradually lost influence in local public administration. Initially, they exercised a certain 
measure of coercive power via the water boards (Dutch: wateringen, waterschappen, or wateringues), 
since all local landowners (in the thirteenth century still a majority of peasants) were represented in 
these boards according to the amount of land they possessed. After the beginning of the fifteenth 
century they gradually lost this type of influence and power over their own community to the 
advantage of non-peasant large landowners.61 This was due to the fact that the new class of large 
farmers were leaseholders who did not have property rights of the land they cultivated. One should 
realize that these wateringen probably had become more important as channels of local power than 
other local institutions such as parishes, seigneuries, schoutheetdommen, or bailiwicks. Therefore, the 
increasing dominance of non-resident large landowners in the water boards probably did contribute 
much to the diminishing solidarity of the village communities, which were still so very prominent in 
 
58 Thoen, ‘A “Commercial Survival Economy” in Evolution’; Brenner, ‘The Low Countries’. 
59 See Mertens, ‘De meekrapteelt’. 
60 Soens, ‘Het waterschap en de mythe van de democratie’. 
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the well-known insurrection of coastal Flanders of 1323–28.62 So, village community solidarity eroded 
and probably not in a lesser degree than was the case in inland Flanders. 
The CBE Agro-system and Crisis 
The late medieval crisis was much more perceptible in coastal Flanders than it was in inland Flanders. 
It is likely that the described agro-system (CBE) was more vulnerable to shocks. We have shown it 
evolving between 1100 and 1700 from a CSE to a CBE system. More and more of these peasants were 
becoming farmers dependent upon market prices for cereals and cattle they sold. The described 
expropriation process had driven them into a competitive leasing system. The late medieval price 
scissors did not favour the farms: as pure wage labourers became more expensive farmers switched as 
much as possible to resident labourers. Their only way to react against this changing agro-system and 
the changing economic development was engrossment. The price evolution favoured the bigger 
commercial farms over smaller semi-commercial farms.63 Proto-industry could not counter this 
evolution as it declined together with the number of smallholdings. What was left was a very polarized 
society: many dispossessed poor people living alongside large and middle-sized farms. It is likely that 
the death rate was highest within the layer of peasants without landed property. Many of them 
probably moved to inland Flanders, trying to buy a small property there, or else to the towns to find 
work. A greater scarcity of labour, as well as the fact that many of the wage labourers had to live from 
their wages to sustain their families, meant that they could not build up their income with revenues 
from smallholdings or proto-industrial activities. This was responsible for the higher wages in coastal 
Flanders. It is clear that these high wages also contributed to an increased vulnerability of the CBE 
system, since bankruptcy was never far for a large number of the farmers. 
The economy became commercial, but more vulnerable for another reason as well. Contrary to 
inland Flanders, this economic system could not profit from a structure of low taxes and other forms of 
surplus extraction. As we mentioned, the large majority of the holdings became leaseholdings. These 
leases were much higher than the customary rents paid by the smaller peasants still prevailing in inland 
Flanders. Moreover the costs which had to be paid to maintain the perilous ecological balance were 
often high, notwithstanding the fact that a structure for sustainable development was not yet 
established, as we explained earlier in this paper. The result was that major environmental problems 
such as storm surges caused a lot of damage in the late Middle Ages. In sum, because of the described 
specific seigniorial relations the farmers of coastal Flanders could not avoid a high burden of taxes and 
levies. Here, the efforts by the possessing classes to switch from stable to flexible levies largely 
succeeded, with a resulting concentration process and the disappearance through bankruptcy of small 
farms. The decreasing numbers of farmers eventually drove down the price of leases in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries (Figure 7.3). 
‘Long live the farm’, the motto of farms in the CBE system created in the late Middle Ages, came at 
the expense of the CSE motto ‘long live the family’. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the past, many models have been put forward to explain the late medieval crisis in Flanders. Often 
these models also tried to explain the relatively limited effects of this crisis. A new set of data based on 
regional studies gives us a clearer picture of this crisis and provides for better explanations. Most 
researchers have written that, in Flanders, the Malthusian check was partly overcome by special 
 
62 There is evidence that the peasant revolt was a reaction against new property and power structures; this will be 
developed in another paper. 
63 Cruyningen, Behoudend maar buigzaam. 
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conditions in supply and demand, such as better nutrition.64 The regional differences shown in this 
article make that argument less likely. Others supposed that in Flanders peasants raised production 
during the crisis through higher physical productivity and new techniques.65 Nowadays we know that 
the most progress in physical productivity occurred in the thirteenth century in both agro-systems, so 
this explanation is not satisfactory either. Others attributed the light effects of the crisis to the nearness 
of a dense town network or suggested accidental or monetary explanations.66 
This paper has shown that an in-depth study of the structures of production and social relations on 
a regional basis, the so called agro-systemic approach, can help put forward nuanced explanations of the 
late medieval crisis. Because the former county of Flanders evolved towards different agro-systems, the 
effects of the crisis diverged from region to region. In the area where the CSE (Flemish commercial 
survival economy) agro-system survived, the effects were more restrained than in those areas which 
evolved towards a more commercially organized system, the CBE (Flemish commercial business 
economy) system. 
Bibliography 
Aerts, Erik, and Eddy Van Cauwenberghe, ‘Die Grafschaft Flandern und die sogenannte spätmittelalterliche 
Depression’, in Europa 1400 : Die Krise des Spätmittelalters, ed. by Ferdinand Seibt and Winfried Eberhard 
(Stuttgart: Klette-Cotta, 1984), pp. 95–116 
Blockmans, Willem, ‘Die Niederlande vor und nach 1400: eine Geselleschaft in der Krise?’, in Europa 1400 : Die Krise 
des Spätmittelalters, ed. by Ferdinand Seibt and Winfried Eberhard (Stuttgart: Klette-Cotta, 1984), pp. 117–32 
———, ‘The Social and Economic Effects of Plague in the Low Countries 1349–1500’, Belgisch Tijdschrift voor 
Filologie en Geschiedenis, 58, (1980), 833–63 
Bois, Guy, Crise du féodalisme: Économie rurale et démographie en Normandie orientale du début du 14e siècle au milieu 
du 16e siècle (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976) 
Brenner, Robert, ‘Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe’, Past and Present, 
70 (1976), 30–75; reprinted in The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-
Industrial Europe, ed. by Trevor H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 
pp. 10–63 
———, ‘The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism’, in Peasants into Farmers? The Transformation of Rural 
Economy and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages–19th Century) in Light of the Brenner Debate, ed. by Peter 
C. M. Hoppenbrouwers and others, CORN-Publication Series, 4 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), pp. 275–338 
Cruyningen, Piet van, Behoudend maar buigzaam: boeren in West-Zeeuws-Vlaanderen 1650–1850, AAG Bijdragen, 
40 (Wageningen: Afdeling Agrarische Geschiedenis, Wageningen Universiteit, 2000) 
Dehaeck, Sigrid, ‘Voedselconsumptie in het Brugse Sint-Janshospitaal tijdens de Middeleeuwen (1280–1440)’, 
Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis ‘Société d’Emulation’ te Brugge, 141 (2004), 3–4, 332–64 
Genicot, Leopold, La crise agricole du bas Moyen-Âge dans le Namurois, (Louvain: Centre belge d’histoire rurale, 1970) 
Gottschalk, Maria, Stormvloeden en rivieroverstromingen, 3 vols (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1971–73) 
Hilton, Rodney H., ‘A Crisis of Feudalism’, Past and Present, 97 (1982), 3–15 
 
64 Van Werveke, De zwarte dood. 
65 Slicher van Bath, ‘The Rise of Intensive Husbandry’. 
66 The role of the towns has been underlined by Van Der Wee, ‘Typologie des crises et changements’; Blockmans, 
‘The Social and Economic Effects’; Blockmans, ‘Die Niederlande vor und nach 1400’. Monetary explanations can be 
found in Aerts and Van Cauwenberghe, ‘Die Grafschaft Flandern’. 
The Family or the Farm: a Sophie’s Choice? Erik Thoen and Tim Soens 
Last saved by DAO on 11 December 2014 at 12:26  Page 146 of 238 
Holbach, Rudolf, Frühformen von Verlag und Grossbetrieb in der gewerblichen Production (13.–16. Jahrhundert), 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte, 110 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1994) 
Kosminsky, Evgeny G., ‘The Evolution of Feudal Rent in England from the XIth to the XVth Centuries’, Past and 
Present, 7 (1955), 12–36 
Kuipers, Jan J. B., ed., Sluimerend in slik: Verdronken dorpen en verdronken land in zuidwest Nederland (Middelburg: 
Stichting Cultureel Erfgoed Zeeland, 2004) 
Lambrecht, Thijs, Een grote hoeve in een klein dorp: relaties van arbeid en pacht op het Vlaamse platteland tijdens de 
18de eeuw, Historische Economie en Ecologie (Ghent: Academia Press, 2002) 
Mertens, Jacques, ‘De meekrapteelt in de omgeving van Brugge vooral in de 14de en 15de eeuw’, Het Brugs 
Ommeland, 21 (1981), 259–82 
Meyhuys, Vera, and Frank Daelemans, De oudste domeinrekeningen van Herzele 1386–1394, Herzele-Dossier, 7, 
Centrum Sociale Structuren en Economische Conjunctuur (Brussels: VUB, 1979) 
Scholliers, Etienne, with the collaboration of Frank Daelemans, De Conjunctuur van een Domein: Herzele 1444–1752, 
Herzele- Dossier, 8, Centrum Sociale Structuren en Economische Conjunctuur (Brussels: VUB, 1981) 
Sivéry, Gérard, Structures agraires et vie rurale dans le Hainaut à la fin du Moyen Âge, 2 vols (Lille: Université de Lille, 
1977–80) 
Slicher van Bath, Bernard H., ‘The Rise of Intensive Husbandry in the Low Countries’, in Britain and the 
Netherlands, ed. by J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossman (London: publisher, 1960), pp. 130–53 
Soens, Tim, ‘Les tourbières disparues de Flandre: Histoire d’un milieu humide d’une grande richesse’, in Aux rives de 
l’incertain: Histoire et représentation des marais occidentaux du Moyen Âge à nos jours, ed. by Philippe Bata (Paris: 
Somogy, 2002), pp. 32–38 
———, ‘Het waterschap en de mythe van de democratie in het Ancien Régime: Het voorbeeld van de Vlaamse 
Kustvlakte in de Late Middeleeuwen’, Jaarboek voor Ecologische Geschiedenis, 4 (2001), 39–56 
———, De spade in de dijk? Waterbeheer en rurale samenleving in de Vlaams kustvlakte (1280–1580) (Ghent: 
Academia Press, 2009) 
Soens, Tim, and Erik Thoen, ‘The Origin of Leaseholding in the Former County of Flanders’, in The Development of 
Leasehold in Northwestern Europe, c. 1200–1600, ed. by Bas J. P. van Bavel and Phillipp R. Schofield (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2008), pp. 31–56 
Thoen, Erik, ‘The Birth of the “Flemish Husbandry”: Agricultural Technology in Medieval Flanders’, in Medieval 
Farming and Technology: The Impact of Agricultural Change in Northwest Europe, ed. by Grenville Astill and John 
Langdon (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 69–88 
———, ‘A “Commercial Survival Economy” in Evolution: The Flemish Countryside and the Transformation to 
Capitalism (Middle Ages – Nineteenth Century)’, in Peasants into Farmers? The Transformation of Rural Economy 
and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages – 19th Century) in Light of the Brenner Debate, ed. by Peter C. M. 
Hoppenbrouwers and others, CORN-Publication Series, 4 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2001), pp. 102–58 
———, ‘Historical Demography in Medieval Rural Flanders: Recent Results and Possibilities’, in Peasants and 
Townsmen in Medieval Europe: Studia in honorem Adriaan Verhulst, ed. by Jean-Marie Duvosquel and others 
(Ghent: Snoeck-Ducaju & Zoon, 1995), pp. 573–82 
———, Landbouwekonomie en bevolking in Vlaanderen gedurende de late Middeleeuwen en het begin van de Moderne 
Tijden. Testregio: de kasselrijen van Oudenaarde en Aalst, Belgisch Centrum voor Landelijke Geschiedenis, 90 
(Ghent: Belgisch Centrum voor Landelijke Geschiedenis, 1988) 
———, ‘Rechten en plichten van plattelanders als instrumenten van machtspolitieke strijd tussen adel, stedelijke 
burgerij en grafelijk gezag in het laat-middeleeuwse Vlaanderen: Buitenpoorterij en mortemain-rechten ten 
persoonlijke titel in de kasselrijen van Aalst en Oudenaarde, vooral toegepast op de periode rond 1400’, in Les 
The Family or the Farm: a Sophie’s Choice? Erik Thoen and Tim Soens 
Last saved by DAO on 11 December 2014 at 12:26  Page 147 of 238 
structures du pouvoir en Belgique et dans les pays limitrophes (XIIe–XIXe siècle): Actes du 13e Colloque International 
Spa 3–5 sept. 1986, Crédit Communal, Collection Histoire, série in-8°, 77 (Brussels: Crédit Commercial,1988), 
pp. 469–90 
———, ‘Social Agro-systems as an Economic Concept: An Essay Taking the Former County of Flanders as an 
Example (Middle Ages – Nineteenth Century)’, in Landholding and Land Transfer in the North Sea Area, ed. by 
Bas P. J. van Bavel and others, CORN Pubication Series, 5 (Turnhout: Brepols 2004), pp. 47–66 
———, ‘De twee gezichten van de Vlaamse landbouw en het probleem der ‘Wüstungen’: Middeleeuwen-Moderne 
Tijden’, in Docendo discimus: Liber Amicorum Romain Van Eenoo, ed. by Jan Art and Luc Francois (Ghent: 
Academia Press, 1999), pp. 75–84 
Thoen, Erik, with Thijs Lambrecht, ‘Le paysage flamand et la structure de la société médiévale: Nouvelles hypothèses 
sur l’origine et la fonction des kouters’, in Autour du ‘village’: Établissements humains, finages et communautés 
rurales entre Seine et Rhin (IVe–XIIIe siècles). Actes du colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve, 16–17 mai 2003, 
ed. by Jean-Marie Yante and Anne-Marie Bultot-Verleysen (Louvain: Institut d’Études Médiévales de l’Université 
Catholique de Louvain, 2010), pp. 379–400 
Thoen, Erik, and Tim Soens, ‘Appauvrissement et endettement dans le monde rural: Étude comparative du crédit 
dans les différents systèmes agraires en Flandre au bas Moyen Âge et au début de l’Époque Moderne’, in Il Mercato 
della Terra: Secc. XIII–XVIII, ed. by Simonetta Cavaciocchi (Firenze: Le Monnier, 2004), pp. 703–820 
———, ‘Energy: Tension beteween Ecology and Economy in Flanders before 1800’, paper presented at the 
International Conference, European Society for Environmental History, Prague, 2003 
———, ‘Van landschapsgeschiedenis naar ecologische geschiedenis: Waterbeheer in de Vlaamse kustvlakte in de Late 
Middeleeuwen en het Ancien Régime’, Jaarboek voor Ecologische Geschiedenis, 4 (2001), 1–24 
Thoen, Erik, and others, Landscapes or Seascapes? The History of the Coastal Environment in the North Sea Area 
Reconsidered, CORN Publication Series, 13 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013) 
Tits-Dieuaide, Marie-Jeanne, ‘Peasants Dues in Brabant: The Example of the Meldert Farm near Tirlemont, 1380–
1797’, in Productivity of Land and Agricultural Innovation in the Low Countries (1250–1800), ed. by Herman Van 
Der Wee and others (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1978), pp. 109–22 
Tys, Dries, ‘Domeinvorming in de “wildernis” ’en de ontwikkeling van vorstelijke macht: Het voorbeeld van het bezit 
van de graven van Vlaanderen in het IJserestuarium tussen 900 en 1200’, Jaarboek voor Middeleeuwse Geschiedenis, 
7 (2004), 31–83 
———, ‘Landschap als materiële cultuur: De interactie tussen macht en ruimte in een kustgebied en de wording van 
een laatmiddeleeuws tot vroegmodern landschap. Kamerlings Ambacht, 500–1200/1600’ (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, Free University of Brussels, 2003) 
Vandenborre, Chris, ‘Prijzen, lonen en levensstandaard in Brugge en omgeving tijdens de 14de en het begin van de 
15de eeuw’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Ghent University, 1999) 
Van Der Wee, Herman, ‘Typologie des crises et changements de structures aux Pays-Bas (XVe–XVIe siècles)’, Annales: 
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 18 (1963), 209–25 
Van Maelzake, Bart, ‘De financieel-economische politiek van het Onze-Lieve-Vrouwhospitaal van Oudenaarde in de 
15de en 16de eeuw’, Handelingen van de Geschied- en Oudheidkundige Kring van Oudenaarde, 39 (2002), 261–92 
Vanslembrouck, Nele, Alexander Lehouck, and Erik Thoen, ‘Past Landscapes and Present-day Techniques: 
Reconstructing Submerged Medieval Landscapes in the Western Part of Sealand Flanders’, Landscape History, 27 
(2005), 51–64 
Van Werveke, Hans, De zwarte dood in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden (1349–1351) (Brussels: Paleis der Academiën, 
1950) 
Verhulst, Adriaan, ‘L’intensification et la commercialisation de l’agriculture dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux au XIIIe 
siècle’, in La Belgique rurale du Moyen-Âge à nos jours: Mélanges offerts à Jean-Jacques Hoebanx (Brussels: Editions 
de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1984), pp. 89–100 
The Family or the Farm: a Sophie’s Choice? Erik Thoen and Tim Soens 
Last saved by DAO on 11 December 2014 at 12:26  Page 148 of 238 
Verstockt, Anne, ‘Conjunctuurstudie van een domein in de late middeleeuwen: Het West-Zeeuws-Vlaams domein 
van de Gentse Sint-Pietersabdij in Oostburg Ambacht aan de hand van pachtprijzen’ (unpublished masters’ thesis, 
Ghent University 1998) 
